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LIFE ON A FEDERAL ISLAND IN THE CIVILIAN SEA
Wil liam E. Crawford*
The Louisiana lawyer practicing both in state court and in the federal system is
subject to legal schizophrenia as a normal way of life.1 The first reason for this
schizophrenia is that under civilian doctrine the basic private law of Louisiana is
limited to the law declared in the Civil Code and other legislation. 2 Its interpreta
tion by the Louisiana judiciary, no matter how often repeated, uniform, o r con
sistent, does not constitute law under the faithfully-held doctrine of jurisprudence

constante as specifically pronounced by the Louisiana Supreme Court, 3 in keeping
with the long-standing tradition of the civilian notion of law as opposed t o inter
pretation of the law by the j u diciary.
In Louisiana there is no rule of stare decisis; instead its counterpart of jurispru

dence constante prevails. Thus, a federal court sitting in a diversity case, in which
it must apply Louisiana substantive law under the Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
rule,4 must apply the appropriate Louisiana legislation, as distinguished from in
terpretations of the legislation pronounced in cases dealing with it; therefore, it is
not bound to apply interpretations of that legislation found in Louisiana decisions,
for those decisions do not bind the Louisiana judiciary itself in later cases. 5 Never
theless, while the federal c o urt is not bound by the jurisprudence, it would be un
reasonable for the federal bench to ignore the interpretations found in Louisiana
decisions unless they are manifestly inappropriate , for the very purpose o f

Erie is

to instruct the federal judiciary in a diversity case to apply the applicable state law
in the manner in which it would be applied in the state courts.6 Determining the
gover ning Louisiana interpretation pronounced through the judiciary can thus be
uncertain.
Ascertaining the correct rule of law can be difficult for the additional reason
that the Louisiana appellate judiciary in 1992 rendered from the courts of appeals
a total of 3533 opinions,7 and from the supreme court, 178,8 contrasted with
the Supreme Court of Mississippi which in 1992 rendered only 386 dispositions

*

James J. Bailey Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. The research and analysis of John

Felder Crawford, II, research assistant for this Article, was indispensable, particularly on the matters ofjurispru
dence constante and the federal treatment of Louisiana products liability cases.

1. The late Judge Alvin B. Rubin visited this area in his article, Hazards of a Civilian Venturer in a Federal
Court: Travel and Tmvail on the Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L. REv. l 369 ( 1988).
2. LA. C!v. CooEANN. art . I (West 1993).

3. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, l 334 (La. 1978).
4. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 637 (1938).
5. Clarkco Contractors, Inc.

v.

Texas E. Gas Pipeline Co., A Div. of Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 615 F.

Supp. 775, 778 (M.D. La. 1985).

6. Erie, 304 U.S. at72-73.

7. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA 26 (1992). There were
251 I civil and I022 criminal opinion s from the courts of appeals in 1992. Id.
8. Id. at 23. There were 131 civil opinions from the supreme court and 47 criminal opinions. Id.

1
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judgment accordingly against the defendant from the appellate
mand and without a further right of appeal.
This procedure is possible only because there is no constitutional right to a civil
jury trial in Louisiana. 11 The Seventh Amendment guarantees a civil jury trial un
der the United States Constitution in the federal system, ensuring that a defendant
winning his case before a jury in federal court-if the jury charges contained no
error and if sufficient evidence supported the jury verdict- c a n feel comfortable
that the case is over as to factual issues. T his same federal guarantee of a civil jury
trial controls summary judgment practice and dispositions by federal judges on
motions for directed verdicts, motions for JNOV, rulings on questions of evidence
before the jury, and any other handling of findings or rulings o n factual issues, for
factual issues must be left to the jury, not determined by the court.

12

In this same vein, the traditional proximate cause issue in Louisiana is known
asthe duty/risk analysis. Under the leading Louisiana case, this analysis is a ques
_
tion fo the cou , not the jury. 1 3 If a federal judge were to determine a proximate
.
cause issue by mvokmg the duty/risk analysis, he would violate the parties'

�

�

� �

Seventh Amen m nt righ . Thus, the lawyer in Louisiana's state court system

�

must prepare his tnal and his appellate argument in ter m s of duty /risk, while in the
federal system he must follow the traditional proximate cause analysis found in the
other states.

9. ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF
MISSISSIPPI 27 (1992)

·

10. LA. CONST. of 1 9 74 art. v, § 5(C).
11. Melancon v. McKeithen 345 F. Supp. 1025 1045 (E
.D. La.),affd,409 U.S. 943(1972),anda ff'd,409
.

ll.S. l!l'JX(l973).

'

.

'

12. S1·c. '"�·. Frn. R. eiv. P. 50 .

1 J. "Regardless if stated in terms of proximate
cause Iegal cause, o.r �uty, the scope
. tcly a question of
of the duty inquiry is
ultuna
policy as to whether the part1cu ar nsk
falls w1thm the scope of the duty." Roberts v.
llcnoit. ti05 So. 2u 1032, 1044
(La.

. l

1991) .
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I.DETERMINING THE Erie RULE

OF

LAW

3

I N LOUISIANA

The most recent Erie mandate on a federal court is that it should seek the cor
rect statement of law in the same fashion that the highest court of the state (in
which the federal court sits) would search, evaluate, and pronounce it. 14 The Erie
mandate may then subdivide into two significantly different intellectual endeav
ors: the Erie evaluation; 15 and, on the other hand, the Erie guess.16
A. The Erie Evaluation
The Erie mandate as followed in common law states by the federal courts is cor
rectly summed up by the following statement: "A federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction and called upon in that role to apply state law is absolutely bound by a
current interpretation of that law formulated by the state's highest tribunal. "17
Clarkco Contractors, Inc. v. Texas Eastern Gas Pipeline Co., A Div ision of Texas
Eastern Transmission Corp. 18 is an excellent illustration of the Erie evaluation
process by a federal judge sitting in Louisiana. The issue before the district court
was whether to apply a c ontractual stipulation of a choice of law provision, or to
decline to apply the stipulation on the ground that to do so would contravene a
strong public policy rule of Louisiana. 19 Following the Erie mandate, the court at
tempted to determine whether Louisiana had departed from the lex loci delicti rule

in tort cases. 20 After a d etailed consideration of the relevant cases and jurispru
dence, the court referred to the opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court in the
leading case, Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co. ;21 but it then followed the observation
of the Fifth Circuit, that "Jagers is far from clear, "22 and concluded that one could
not rely on Jagers to say that Louisiana had departed from the lex loci delicti rule
that Louisiana had firmly adopted the interest analysis considered in Jagers. 23
At this point, the judge, referring to jurisp rudenc e constante, observed that
Louisiana civilian tradition did not require him to find Jagers controlling: "[I]n a
civilian jurisdiction such as Louisiana, it is risky business to rely overly much
upon extensions of judicial decisions as stating the applicable law, particularly
where, as here, Article 10 of the Civil Code provides a statutory basis for the
law

.

..."24

14. C H ARLFS A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTS § 58, at 373(41h ed. 1983).
15. Clarkco Contractors, Inc. v. Texas E. Gas Pipeline Co.,

Supp. 775, 776(M.D. La. 1985).

A

Div. of Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 615 F.

16. Thom pson v. Johns-M anville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581, 582 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.

110 2(1984).

17. Daigle v. Maine Medical Ctr., Inc., 14 F.3d684, 689 (1st Cir. 1994).
18.615F.Supp. 775(M.D. La. 1985).
19. Id. at 776.
2 0 . Id. at 777. Lex loci delicti refers to the "place of the wrong." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 911 (6th ed. 1990).
21. 276So. 2d309(La. 1973).
22. Lee v. Hunt. 631F.2d1171, 1175(5th Cir. 1980 ), cerr. denied, 454 U.S. 834(1981).
23. C l arkco Contractors, Inc. v. Texas E. Gas Pipeline Co.

Supp. 775, 777(M.D. La. 1985).

24. Id. at 778(footnote omitted).

.

A Div. of Tex. E. Transmission Corp . 615 F.
.
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Footnote two of the Clarkco opinion articulates so fully and w ith such great rel
evance the entire Erie evaluation proces s under jurisprudence constante that it is
set forth herein in full. 25 Whether an Erie search under the rule of stare decisis 26
would yield a different-sounding discu ssion is beyond the shore of this civilian
sea.
The essence of the theory ofjurisprudence constante, as recognized by the judge
in C/arkco, is that judicial precedent is e stablished by a judge on the basis of gen
eral rules of law provided by legislators for the decision of those disputes, and is
not based on the general rules of law extracted from judicial precedent.27 The ac
cumulated precedents gain significance because the words of the legislation, as
consistently spoken by judges in their decisions, are attributed to the legislator,
and·the meaning of the rule of law enacted by the legislator is taken from the spe
cific meaning given to it by judges. 28 Further, the judge analyzes those judicial de
cisions to determine whether or not they comprise a general rule of law consistent
with the needs of the pending case. 29 If what he f inds does not fit the needs of the
case, then he may disregard the law as spoken by the judges and "return to the
words of the general rule of law spoken by the legislator, under the theory that
judges are bound to apply the law as given to them by the legislature and not as
paraphrased by other judges."30
The Louisiana Supreme Court, explaining the doctrine, said in part:
In Louisiana, courts are not bound by the doctrine ofstare decisis, but there is a rec
ognition in this State of the doctrine ofjurisprudence constante. Unlike

stare decisis,

this latter doc trine does not contemplate adherence to a principle of law announced
and applied on a single occasion in the past.
However, when, by repeated decisions in a long line of cases, a rule of law has
been accepted and applied by the courts, these adjudications assume the dignity of

25. Footnote two states:
For example, Johnson
.

v.

St. Paul Mercury lns[urance] Co., while distaining [sic] the doctrine of stare

decis'.s did recogmze the doctrine ?f jurisprudence constante. After citing a long l ine of Louisiana cases
.
stretching
over a seventy year period applying the lex loci delicti doctrine as the "established rule "the

�

court noted: ''Fundamental and elementary principles recognize that certainty and constancy of th law
arc indispensable to or erly social intercourse, a sound economic climate and a stable government."
So.2d [sic) at 218. Exactly three years later Johnson was expressly overruled byJawrs
�
o·
oyal /11d<'m111ty Co.
Louisiana i ooks first to stmutory law. . . . "In deciding the issue before us the lower courts did not

�

llolmsmi,123?
R

·

� oll�w t�� p rocess of referrmg first to the code and other legislative sources but treated language from
opimon as the primary source of law. This is an indication that the position of the decided
�as c . an 11\ustratmn of past expene.nce.and the theory of the individualizati on of decision have not

�.JU. '.c·1�
as

. proper y understood by our JUnsts m many instances."
ccn
.
··
IArdmn v. Hart fordAcc1den
t&lndem.Co.,]3 60So.2d[sic][l3311
' I33 4[( . 1978)]. Lou1s1ana has
.
.
no lcg1slat1ve
onfli ct of laws rule in tort cases. It maY be important to b�ar .m mmd that the
Restatement
.
<Second)Connicts of Laws ( 1969) has not been ad opted by the Louisiana
Legislature as a part of the
Civil Code: Article 1 o is a part of theCode.
.
615 F. Supp. at 778 n. (citations omitted) (emphasis added)

�

c

Ua�kc1: Cmumctors.
�6.

To abide by.

2

or

C

adhere to. decided cases." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 6th ed.
1990) .

-1. Juuo C. CUETO-RUA, JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW
70 (1981)
28. /ti. at 74.
29. lei. at 76.
JO. Id. at 77.

·
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jurisprudence constante; and the rule oflaw upon which they are based is entitled to

great weight in subse quent decisions. 31

It is thus submitted that the federal judges sitting in Louisiana are not bound by
the recent pronouncements in Gauthier v. O'Brien32 and Touchard v. Williams,33
each of which is a single Louisiana Supreme Court pronouncement as to the mean
ing or interpretation of A rticle 2324 of the Civil Code, which regulates solidary
liability among joint tortfea sors.34 On the face of those opinions, compared to the
legislators' words they interpret, there is room to differ seriously with whether the
c ases are correct interpretations of the law. According to all of the foregoing ex
position of the doctrine of jurisprudence constante, a federal judge sitting in
Louisiana under the mandate of Erie, with the corollary doctrine of jurisprudence
constante, is not bound to follow those decisions. The keystone of this proposition
is that the Erie mandate directs a federal judge to incorporate the d octrine of
jurisprudence constante into his divining of the Louisiana substantive law applica
ble to the case before him, 35 an evaluation process that must go beyond the most
recent Louisiana Supreme Court opinion.
B. The Erie Guess
In Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 36 the court in a diversity case had
the following issue: "This Louisiana diversity appeal requires us to d etermine
whether the law of that state would dispense with proof of causation against some
o f [the] multiple defendants in an asbestosi s case."37 The court found that
Louisiana had not adopted such a dispensation of proof in any reported case, that
the theories advanced b y the plaintiff represented radical departures from tradi
tional theories of tort liability, a nd that the only support for the plaintiffs claim as
to Louisiana law was a supposed tendency of Louisiana courts to expand the liabil
ity of manufacturers , which the court found insufficient to make such an expansion
of Louisiana doctrine. 38 The court therefore d eclined to adopt the theory as the
law of Louisiana. 39
The dissent criticized the majority for making an "Erie guess," saying that the
majority was predicting what the Louisiana courts would do, and that such a case
of first impression should be determined by a certification of the question to the
Louisiana Supreme Court. 40

31. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 236So. 2d 216, 218 (La. 1 970 ) , overruled by lagers

dem. Co . . 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 19 73).

v.

Royal ln-

32. 618 So. 2d 825 (La. 1993) (interpreting revised Article 2324 of the Civil Code).
33. 617 So. 2d 885 (La. 1993) (interp reting revised Article 2324 of the Civil Code).
34. LA. Civ. CoDEANN. art. 2324(West 1979&Supp. 1994).
35. C larkco Contractors, Inc.

v.

Texas E. Gas Pipeline Co. , A Div. of Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 615 F.

Supp. 775, 778 (M.D. La. 1985).
36. 714 F.2d581 (5th Cir. 1983), cerr. denied,465 U.S. 1102 (1984).

37. Thompson, 714 F.2d at 581.
38. Id. at 583.
39. Id.
40. Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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In discussions of the doctrine of jurisprudence
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constante, frequent reference is

made to the fact that legislation (which includes the Civil Code a n d other statutes)

�

is the primary source of law. There should be no h at�s, no quest ion on � hich the
.
law does not speak, because of Article 4 of the Civil Code, which provides that
when there is no applicable rule in the legislation, the court must proceed accord
ing to equity- resorting to 'justice, reason, and prevailing usages. "41
If the theory and doctrine of judicial application of law o perates as the
Louisiana Supreme Court has stated and as commentators have frequently writ
ten, it is submitted that the majority in

Thompson was completely correct in decid

ing the case on its own legal analysis because it was simply obeying the mandate of

Erie and the civilian process in Louisiana, particularly in view o f the positive di
rective in Article 4 of the Civil Code. Thus, if there are no cases, then the court
must itself go to the legislative source, and if there is no legislat i ve source specifi
cally applicable, then the Civil Code commands that the court resort to "equity. "42
Can it be said that there is no applicable rule of Louisiana law on a question simply
because there is no appellate court opinion pronouncing a rule? The Civil Code is
a positive statement to the contrary. A federal judge sitting in Louisiana should
never consider himself to be making a guess, for he is only applying the law as the
civilian system commands the judge to do. He is likewise, as a federal judge, com
manded to follow the state civilian theory, which, it is submitted, is inherent in the
mandate of Erie as applied to Louisiana.
C.

Current Practice with Certification of Questions

Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13: 72 .1 provides that t h e Supreme Court
or the circuit courts of appeals of the United States may certify questions to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, "which certificate the supreme court of this state may,
by written opinion, answer."43 Rule XII of the Louisiana Supreme Court Rules im
plements the foregoing statutory provision, but adds an interesting sentence: "This
court may, in its discretion, decline to answer the questions c ertified to it ."44
The certification of questions has been used heavily in Louisiana. Electronic

�

�

r�search s ows that from pril 19, 1963, through July 22, 1994, a total of eighty
.
nme questions were cert1f1ed from federal court.45 The questions ranged across
the spectrum of legal issues.45 By contrast, the Fifth Circuit h a s certified to the

� from Nov�mber 30, 1964, through October 19, 1992,

Mississippi Suprem� Cou

only f ?rty-one questions. A substantial number of major pronouncements by the
.
Lou1s1ana Supreme Court-fundamental to different areas of the law, though with

41. "When no rule for a particular situation can be
·
derived from leg is1atton
· or custom, the court 1s bound to
. .
prn.:ccd accord mg to equity. To decide equitably, reso rt is
. made to1us11ce,
reason, and prevailing usages." LA.
Civ. ConF. ANN. art. 4 (West 1993).
42. fd.
4J. LA. Rl'v.

STAT. ANN. § 13:72.1(West 1983).

44. LA. Sur. Cr. R. XII.
45. S.:arch ofWESTLAW,
46. /d.
47. /c/.

CTA5 database (July 26, 1994).
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a heavy concentration in the torts area48 - have been in response to the certified
question procedure.
It is difficult to find a sharp distinction among the cases that the Fifth Circuit
chooses to answer for itself, such as Thompson, 49 as opposed to those in which it
certifies the question, such as Halphen v. Johns-Manv ille Sales Corp.50 Two very
significant Fifth Circuit opinions, both authored by the late Judge Alvin Rubin,
r uled on the retroactivity vel non of the Louisiana Products Liability Act, without
certifying that question. 51 It is an interesting comparison of judicial techniques to
see the exhaustive analysis and research devoted to the questions by Judge Rubin,
a s opposed to the terse decree of nonretroactivity by the Louisiana Supreme
Court. 52 The principles underlying the doctrine of jurisprudence constante might
well say that it is the federal rule on that question that should be followed, rather
than the Louisiana Supreme Court opinion.
The high court of Maryland responded to a certified question from a federal dis
trict court in that state. 53 The federal court found the opinion to be unusable, so
that it decided the case using its own legal analysis. 54
II. APPELLATE REVIEW

OF

FACT VS.

SEVENTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEE

OF

JURY TRIAL

Louisiana's constitutional grant of jurisdiction over the facts as well a s the law55
is perhaps a more profound difference between practice in state court and practice
in federal court than is the difference between civil law and common law. As fore
shadowed in the introductory paragraphs of this A rticle, the Louisiana appellate
judiciary has the authority not only to reverse the finding of a jury on the facts, but
to pronounce a final judgment from the appellate bench, without remand. 56 A de
fendant thus cast in judgment has no effective right of appeal. He does have the
right to apply for writs from the Louisian a Supreme Court, but of the 1477
applications filed in civil cases in 1993, only 245 were granted.57 Jurisdiction of
the facts (and the corollar y p ower to determine them) is not a theoretical or aca
demic power in the hands of the Louisiana appellate judiciary. As of July 1994,

48. Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 52 1 So. 2d 1 1 23 (La. 1 988); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484
So. 2d 110 (La. 1 986); Bell v. Jee W heel Blast, Div. ofErvin Indus., 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985); Olsen v. Shell
Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978).
49. T hompson

v.

Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (Sch Cir. 1983),

cert. denied,

465 U.S. 1 1 02

(1984).
50. 484 So. 2d l lO(La. 1 986).
51. Miles v. Olin Corp., 922 F.2d 122 1 (5th Cir. 1991); Lav esp er e v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 9 1 0
F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1990},

cert.

denied, 114 S . Ct. 171 (1993).

52. Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., 582 So. 2d 1263 (La. 1 991).
53. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1 985). See also Delahanty v. Hinckley, 845 F.2d 1069,
1071

(D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Indeed, Kelley's theoretical underpinnings

54.

Kelley,

are somewhat unclear.").

497 A.2d at 1161-62.

55. "Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the jurisdiction of the supreme court in civil cases
extends to both law and facts." LA. CONST. of 1 974, art.
appeals is essentially the same.

Id. §

V, § 5(C).

The p rovision for the Louisiana courts of

IO(B).

56. Wright v. f'dramount-Richards T h eatres, Inc., 198 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1952).
57. ANNUAL REPORT Of THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF LoUISIANA 23 (1993).

[Vol. 15: 1

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

8

electronic research showed that among the courts of appeals and the supreme
court since 1983, jury verdicts were reversed on the facts in approximately 173
cases. 58 The jury was reversed on quantum in approximate Iy 1 16 cases. 59 This is
not to say that in all those cases final judgments contrary to the jury verdict were
rendered on the spot from the appellate bench.
The federal courts have long been aware of this difference in jurisdiction over
facts:
As to the sufficiency of the evidence on the issues of negligence and contributory
negligence, we are governed by the standard developed in Boeing Co.

v.

Shipman.

Louisiana appellate courts, on the other hand, have the right and the duty to review
both the law and the facts in civil cases. "As a consequence of that situation, in ci vii
cases federal courts evaluating decisions of Louisiana state courts as precedents
have the difficult task of separating the decisions of the Louisiana courts on the law
from their review of the facts

.•

.so

The practice in the courts of Louisiana was set forth in

Richards Theatres, Inc. :61

Wright v. Paramount

In the state of Louisiana, the principles of the common l a w are not recog
nized; neither do the principles of the civil law of Rome furnish the basis of
their jurisprudence. They have a system peculiar to themselves, adopted by
their statutes, which embodies much of the civil law, some of the principles of
the common law, and, in a few instances, the statutory provisions of other
states. This system may be called the civil law of Louisiana, and is peculiar to
that state.
Continuing to describe the Louisiana practice, Mr. Justice McLean said[:] "The
facts found by the jury are examined by the appellate court, and its judgment is given
on the facts, without the intervention of a jury."
In Louisiana state courts, the right to trial by jury guarant e e d by the Seventh
Amendment of the United States Constitution does not exist. The Louisiana Code of
Practice of 1870 provides for jury trials in certain civil cases; b u t app ellate courts
have the right and duty to review both the law and the facts in all civil cases.
Federal �ourts are forbidden by the Seventh Amendment to re-examine any fact
.
by a Jury otherw ise than according to the rules of the common law while
tried

�ouis �ana �tate c�u�s can review the facts in all civil cases. As a consequenc� of that

.
Jury cases federal courts evaluating decisions of Louisiana
s1tuat1on, m c1v1I
ourts as precedents have the difficult task of separating the decisions of the
.
courts on the law from their review of facts.62
Louisiana

state

�

58. Electronic data (on file with the Mississippi

59. Electronic data (on file with the Mississippi

College Law Review).
College Law Review).

60. M1skdl v. Southern Food Co . 439 F 2d 790 79
2 (51h Cir. 1971) (c1tat1ons omitted) (emphasis added)
Wright. 198 F.2d at 306).
.

I quoting

·

·

'

·

·

hi. 198 F2d 303 (5th Cir 1952).
h�. Id. at �06 I quoting Parsons v. Bedford 28 U.S.
(3 Pet ) 433, 450, 451 (1830)).
.

,

.

·
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A recent case illustrating the exercise of this authority is Hines v.

9

Remington

Arms Co. 63 The plaintiff was severely injured when his rifle accidentally fired into
a gun powder canister. 64 The rifle was used purely for competition shooting and
had a very sensitive trigger which allegedly discharged when the bullet was cham
b ered, without any delib e rate pulling of the trigger itself.65 The facts were that the
plaintiff fired the rifle with the muzzle six to eight i nches from the cardboard can
ister of powder.66 The claim against Remington was dismissed at an early stage,67
and the case proceeded against the manufacturer of the powder and against the
maker of the rifle.68 The jury found both defendants not liable because neither the
rifle nor the gun powder was defective. 69 The court of appeals reversed the jury
verdict and found the maker of the rifle liable under the per se liability theory for
an unreasonably dangerous product,70 and found the powder manufacturer liable
for failure to warn as to safe storage of the gun powder.71 The court of appeals
awarded a judgment of $2,000, 000 in general damages to the victim himself and

$50,000 to his wife for her loss of consortium.72 Attorney's fees
were awarded under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2545 in the amount of t wenty

then awarded

five percent of the total judgment against the maker of the rifle. 73 All told, the
judgment awarded was i n the sum of

$2,458, 128.92, not including the consor

tium award of $50,000. 74 At the same time, the court fixed the allocation of fault
at thirty-four percent to the plaintiff, and thirty-three percent to each of the defend
ants. 75 This was all determined from the appellate bench, without remand;76 there
was no effective appeal from this judgment.
A second example of Louisiana courts' authority over factual issues is set out in
Weatherford

v.

Commercial Union Insurance Co. 77 A priest was driving his car and

saw the eight-year-old victim riding in the same direction on his new bicycle. 78 As
Father Termini rounded a curve, the victim suddenly turned his bicycle to the
right, directly into the path of Ter mini's vehicle.79 The jury found he was n o t negli
gent. 00 The court of appeals reviewed the record and stated:

63. 630 So. 2d809 (La. Ct. App.

Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
64.

1993).

at812.
at8 13.
at 8 12.
at813.
at812.
at 8 14.

7 I . Id. at 817.
72. Id.
73.

/d.

at819.

74. Id. at817.

75.
76.

Id.
Id.

at 820.

77. 637 So. 2d1208(La. Ct. App. 1994).
78. Id. at 1209.

79. Id.
80. Id.

at 1210.
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However under the facts and circumstances here presented, we are convinced that
the jury

:nanifestly er red in its determination. Conside�ing the high degre� of care

that is required of a motoris t when he sees a young child on the road, neither the
jurisprudence nor the evidence supports the jury's determination that Father
Ter mini was not negligent in the manner in which he operated his vehicle shortly

prior to and at the time of the accident. 8

1

A third example is Beckham v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 82 This case
was tried to the court without a jury. 83 The judge found the defendant surgeon not
liable, concluding that he had not committed medical malpractice. 84 The court of
appeals reversed the judgment, found the defendant negligent, 85 and from the ap
pellate bench awarded a judgment of $144,221.17 with interest and costs.86
It is typical in these cases that the reversal of the jury verdict is not based upon

an error in the charge to the jury. In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court has ad
monished the courts of appeals that, if in reviewing a record the court discovers an
error in the charge, they are to formulate a correct charge for themselves, read the
transcript, and render judgment accordingly, without remand, taking cognizance
of the correct statement of law. 87 The s ignificance of a clear statement of the law is
thus much diminished in the Louisiana system of appellate review of fact.88
On the other hand, an accurate statement of the law is sacramental if the case is
being tried in a federal court under the Seventh Amendment g uarantee of a jury
trial. If on review by the federal court of appeals a substantial error was found in
the jury charge, the verdict, whether for the plaintiff or for the defendant, would
be set aside and the case remanded for trial under the correct c harge. 89 Electronic
research has shown that this reversal of jury verdicts is virtually n onexistent in the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In the last compilation of f i gures, over a period of
seventy-five years, until 1987 when the review was last accomplished, only thir
teen cases had been reversed on the facts.9° Contrary to the Louisiana system, in

?

none of t ose cases could the federal circuit court of appeals render a final judg
ment a gamst a defendant from the appellate bench.

A. Duty/Risk vs. Proximate Cause
Th e judicially-adopted and certified mode of analysis for actions ex delicto is
.
d�scnbed �s the duty/risk analysis. The significant difference between the duty/

nsk analysis and the traditional proximate cause analysis (as set forth by Justice

81. Id.
82. 614 So. 2d 760 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
8.\. Id. at 763.
84. Id.
85. /d. at 767.
86. Id. at 772.
87. S<·e Gonzales

v. Xerox Corp., 320 So.
2d 163, 165 (La. 1975).
88. Parsons v. Bedford. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 443
(1830).
89. WRIGllT mpm note 14, § 94, at 630.
90. William E. Crawford Should Louisiana
R eam
t · civ1·1 Appellate Review of
Facts?, 35 LA. B.J. 245, 250
(1987).
.

.

•

1994)
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Andrews in his dissent to Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.91) is that, under the
duty Irisk analysis, the issue of whether the harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable to
the defendant is treated as a question of policy or law, rather than one of fact. The
question is asked whether the risk of the injury that occurred fell within the ambit
of the duty incumbent upon the defendant. The leading case on this point holds that
the decision is one of policy. 92 The case does not go s o far as to say that it is a ques
tion of law, but it is well-recognized that questions of policy are for the court,
while questions of fact are for.the jury. Thus, in federal court under the civil jury
trial guarantee, a proximate cause issue in the traditional sense must be accorded
to the jury because what constitutes a question of fact under the Seventh Amend
ment is determined through historic standards -i.e. , the questions of fact de
scribed in the Seventh Amendment are those so classified at the time the
Amendment was adopted in 1791.93 The earliest torts treatises all classify the
proximate cause issue as a question of fact for the jury. It could therefore make a
significant difference in the outcome of a case involving a substantial proximate
cause question as to whether the parties found themselves in federal court or in
state court, in the hands o f the jury or in the hands of the judge.
B. Precedential Value ofAppellate Fact Finding
Particularly in the area of products liability, Louisiana appellate courts have
found products to be defective upon reviewing all of the evidence. For Erie pur
poses, is this a rule of substantive law as to a given product, or is it a finding of
fact, as a matter of law? S everal opinions can be construed to be

apronouncement

of substantive law. There are several escalator cases in Louisiana in which children
injured their feet by having them caught between the moving stairs and the side
wall of the escalator. The leading case stated: "The inescapable conclusion is that
escalators, for all their utility, are unreasonably dangerous to small children... .
Although not unreasonably dangerous p
' er se', escalators are unreasonably dan
gerous to small children, making their manufacturers and custodians strictly liable
for escalator injuries to those children.''94
The obvious implication brought forth an application for rehearing which was
denied per curiam:

91. 162N.E.99(N.Y.1928).
92. Ro berts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d !032, 1044 (La. 1991). See also the full analysis of the problem by David
W. Robertson, The Precedent Value ofConclusions ofFact in Civil Cases in England and Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV.
78, 93 (1968).
93. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 92, at 609.
94. Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 514 So. 2d439, 444 (La. 1987).
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It is not our intention to hold that a l l escalators are unreasonably dangerous to small
children. We merely found that the escalator in this case was unreas nably d nger
�
�
ous because of a failure to provide an adequate warning of a d anger mherent m the
use of the escalator which was not within the knowledge of or obv ious to the ordi
nary user. This is an independent finding by this court and not an affirmance of the
trial court's directed verdict which was flawed by an error of l a w 95
.

A similar situation, found in Antley v.
v.

YamaluiMotor Corp., U. S.A. 96 and Laing

American Honda Motor Co. ,97 involved three-wheeler all terrain vehicles, in

which those vehicles were found as a matter of law to be unreasonably dangerous
per se under Louisiana products liability law.
While the problem has not been confronted in a case, the question is raised
whether the Louisiana Court of Appeals has declared as a s ubstantive matter that
escalators are unreasonably dangerous for small children (but for the rehearing per
curiam); and has it been declared as a matter of substantive law that all three
wheeler all terrain vehicles are actionably defective under products liability law? If
that is the effect of the holding, how would it affect the Erie r ule in a diversity case
in federal court involving one of those products? It follows that one would have to
prove only that the accident was caused by a three-wheeler. The question of defec

tiveness would have been predetermined by the Louisiana appellate opinion al
ready so holding as a matter of substantive law.
III. CONCLUSION

Erie mandate to the federal courts sitting in Louisiana in diversity cases
includes the civilian doctrine of jurisprudence constante. The federal judge is n ot
The

bound by the last statement of the law pronounced by the appellate courts of
Louisiana, because the doctrine of stare decisis is not found in Louisiana. In the
absence of jurisprudence on a question, under the Louisiana s ubstantive law found
in the Civil C ode, the federal court i s free to go to L ouisiana legislation and any

other sources of law to answer the question before it as though it were a Louisiana
court; thus, certification seems unnecessary.

In the. federal �ourts sitting in Louisiana, the Seventh Amendment guarantee of
.
a J �? tr�al pr ev a tls over the L uisia a appellate review of fact when questions of
.
. are mvo�ved Whether an issue is a question of fact is fo r the federal court to
fact.

�

�crnle, and

�

1� not governed by the practice of the Louisiana appellate judiciary to

answer questions of fact as matters of law.
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